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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note addresses the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege to employees who communicate with their attorneys via e-
mail on an employer's computer, whether through the employer's
server or a private e-mail account. The crux of this issue is that while
employees may have a subjective belief in the confidentiality of such
communications, they may be wrong. This is because employers often
have policies that allow them to monitor an employee's computer
usage and to take possession of e-mails sent from or viewed on
company computers, whether on a work e-mail account or a private
one.1 Indeed, one study concluded that sixty-six percent of companies
* Jonathan Levy, J.D., The University of Texas School of Law, 2013. Thanks to the I/S
editing team for helping develop this Note.
1 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 459 (2011) (advising
attorneys of the prevalence of employer policies allowing the company access to e-mail
communications on its computers). Some states require companies to make employees
aware of potential monitoring through such policies. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
48d(b) (West 2003) (requiring prior written notice of potential monitoring except in
limited circumstances); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b) (West 2005) (forbidding
monitoring unless the employer either (i) provides notice of monitoring potential at least
once each day that the employee accesses employer e-mail or Internet services, or (2) has
given a one-time notice of a monitoring policy in writing or electronic record acknowledged
by the employee).
And as for federal statutes, for an article proposing an interpretation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and Stored Communications Act that would provide
more protection for employees' e-mails, see Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive
Interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act for the Electronic
Monitoring ofEmployees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 461, 485-529 (2012). But see Lawrence E.
Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
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monitor Internet use and forty-three percent monitor e-mail use.2
Moreover, companies often later retrieve e-mails that are stored on
their servers.3 E-mails are therefore "like weeds in a garden. Once you
think you have obliterated them all, they reappear."4
While "[n]othing about server-storage, itself, gives notice to the
employee that safeguards need to be in place to preserve privilege
confidentiality from server access,"a employer policies may give such
notice. 6 One court declared that a belief that e-mails would not be
stored and retrievable given such notice was "unreasonable . .. in this
technological age . . ." 7 Nevertheless, employees continue to
communicate with their attorneys via e-mail on company computers.8
Thus, in this situation "legal principle collides with reality"9 and
INT'L & CoMP. L. 379, 401-03 (2000) (noting that the ECPA "has generally proven
ineffective in protecting employees in the workplace from their employers' monitoring"
and pointing to three exceptions in the statute that give employers practically free rein to
monitor).
2 See The Latest on Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, AM. MGMT. Ass'N (Mar. 13,
2008), http://www.amanet.org/training/articles/The-Latest-on-Workplace-Monitoring-
and-Surveillance.aspx (summarizing the findings of the 2007 Electronic Monitoring &
Surveillance Survey).
3 See, e.g., Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH) (MLO), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29387, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (including forensic retrieval of e-
mails in the factual scenario); Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, 04-2618 BLS2, 2006
Mass. Super. LEXIS 371, at *3-4 (Mass. Super. Aug. 3, 2006) (same); Stengart v. Loving
Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 65o, 656 (N.J. 2010) (same); Banks v. Mario Indus., 650
S.E.2d 687, 691 (Va. 2007) (same).
4 John Gergacz, Employees' Use ofEmployer Computers to Communicate with Their Own
Attorneys and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 10 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 269, 278
(2006).
5Id. at 280.
6 See infra Part II.C (explaining cases in which employers' policies make clear that
employees have no expectation of privacy in the use of company computers).
7 Alamar Ranch, LLC v. Cnty. of Boise, No. CV-09-oo4-S-BLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
ioi866, at *11 (D. Idaho Nov. 2, 2009).
8 See John K. Villa, Emails Between Employees and Their Attorneys Using Company
Computers: Are They Still Privileged?, 26 No. 3ACC DOCKET 102, 102 (2oo8) (observing
that employees use corporate computers for otherwise privileged attorney communications
"even in matters where the employee and the company are adverse").
9 Id.
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judges have to "decide whether a commonly held incorrect belief is an
objectively reasonable one."1o
Courts addressing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
to employees who communicate with their attorneys via e-mail on an
employer's computer have come up with a variety of conclusions.1
One commentator points out why this might be the case:
[P]roblems may emerge when considering such
variables as (1) use of a personal password-protected e-
mail account, (2) other employees' use of personal e-
mail at work, (3) employee attempts to delete or hide
files from the employer, (4) the forensic method used
by the employer to recover information, or (5) any
other technologically related facts where the court is
unable to easily determine the objective relevance of
the evidence.12
Indeed, with the rich variety of factual scenarios that accompany this
issue, it may be that courts "reverse-engineer[]" decisions to reach the
desired result.13
The goal of this Note is to propose and defend an analytical
framework for this issue that will lead to greater predictability in cases
and will create workable compromises. This Note proposes that courts
replace the current reasonableness test with the following two-part
test: (1) The attorney-client privilege is presumed to not apply if, and
only if, there is a clear policy allowing monitoring or retrieval of e-
mails, and the employee knows or should know about it;14 (2) The
employee can override that presumption by attempting to protect his
e-mails at all relevant times.
10 Adam C. Losey, Note, Clicking Away Confidentiality: Workplace Waiver ofAttorney-
Client Privilege, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1201 (2oo8).
1 See infra Part II.C (outlining the holdings and rationales of many courts).
12 Losey, supra note 10, at 1203; see also infra Parts II.C, III.A-B (discussing those and
other variables).
13 Losey, supra note 10, at 1199.
14 For another note that proposes beginning with such a presumption, see Losey, supra
note 10, at 1202-04 (arguing that the application of a presumption of waiver as a first step
will prevent the collision of the "broad (modern) approach" to and the "narrow
(traditional) interpretation" of the attorney-client privilege).
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To set the stage for the proposal, Part II will discuss the competing
policies underlying the attorney-client privilege by summarizing In re
Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 15 the leading case on this issue, and
explain the recent body of case law. Part III will then explain the
proposal, apply it to certain factors, discuss its benefits, and address
objections. Finally, Part IV will summarize the proposal, discuss the
significance of the recent ABA opinion on attorneys' duties to clients
regarding workplace e-mails, and note the limitations of the proposal
with respect to the future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Policies Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege
Because employee e-mails on an employer's computer presents a
gray area with respect to the attorney-client privilege, whether one
would apply the privilege in a given scenario may depend on what
underlying policy one holds as more important. On the one hand,
application of the privilege may keep out relevant evidence. Professor
Wigmore argued that the privilege "ought to be strictly confined
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle," because while "[the privilege's] benefits are all indirect and
speculative[,] its obstruction is plain and concrete . . . . It is worth
preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an
obstacle to the investigation of the truth."16
On the other hand, the privilege's "purpose is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice."17 Without the protection of the privilege,
1s In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
16 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291 (John T.
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961), quoted in Losey, supra note 10, at 1185; accord Aventa
Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, u11 (W.D. Wash. 2011) ("The privilege
is so limited because it sometimes results in the exclusion of relevant and material
evidence, contrary to the philosophy that justice requires the fullest disclosure of the facts."
(quoting Sitterson v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. No. 114, 196 P.3d 735, 741 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008))); Kelcey Nichols, Hiding Evidence from the Boss: Attorney-Client Privilege and
Company Computers, 3 SHIDLER.J. L. COM. & TECH. 6, 7 (2oo6) ("Courts construe
attorney-client privilege narrowly because the privilege results in withholding information
from the fact-finder.").
17 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980).
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"the employee has a strong incentive to avoid seeking legal advice.
This is the chilling effect the privilege is designed to prevent,""' but it
occurs when an opponent can "fold the protections of privilege into a
paper tiger."19 But applying the privilege "provide[s] a shield which
creates a safe harbor so that clients can confide in their attorneys with
confidence."2o
With respect to employee e-mails on employers' computers, both
of these arguments come into play. Because employees and employers
are generally opposing parties in these cases,2 1 the latter have an
interest in killing the application of the privilege in order to discover
potentially helpful information. They have support in the Wigmore
view. But if employers can "intercept[]" otherwise privileged attorney-
client communications "without the employee's knowledge and [use
them] against the employee," the "chilling effect" may occur.22 So
employees have a strong argument in favor of applying the privilege in
these situations.
18 Losey, supra note 10, at 1188.
19 Id., quoted in Louisa L. Hill, Gone But Not Forgotten: When Privacy, Policy and
Privilege Collide, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 565, 588 (2011). A paper tiger is "one that
is outwardly powerful or dangerous but inwardly weak or ineffectual." MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paper%20tiger (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
20 Gergacz, supra note 4, at 271. For an argument that the need for clients' confidence in
confiding in their attorneys outweighs the concern for admissibility of evidence
purportedly covered by the privilege, see id. at 270-71.
21See infra Part II.C (providing numerous examples of cases in which an employee
opposed his company). For examples of cases where a party other than the employer
sought to utilize employee e-mails on the employer's computer, see, e.g., DeGeer v. Gillis,
No. 09 C 6974, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97457, at *2, *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2010) (co-
employees who subpoenaed the employer for the external hard drive of the plaintiffs
company-issued computer); United States v. Hatfield, No. o6-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 106269, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009) (United States, which obtained
purportedly privileged material from the defendants' employer); Alamar Ranch, LLC v.
Cnty. of Boise, No. CV-09-oo4-S-BLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS ioi866, at *2, *11 (D. Idaho
Nov. 2, 2009) (plaintiff, who subpoenaed a nonparty's attorney for documents, some of
which were e-mails sent by a client from her work address on a company computer).
22 Losey, supra note 10, at 1188. But see id. at 1187 ("If courts apply the [Wigmore] view of
attorney-client privilege, it is unclear whether employees would be discouraged from
speaking with counsel while at work.").
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B. The Asia Global Decision
Asia Global set the stage for the current reasonableness-based
analysis of the attorney-client privilege's applicability to employee e-
mails. In Asia Global, the Chapter 7 trustee of Asia Global's
bankruptcy case was investigating certain transactions of five of the
company's principal officers.23 The officers withheld from production
certain e-mails containing attorney-client communications that were
left on the company e-mail servers.2 4 Following the trustee's motion to
compel production, the trustee argued that use of the company e-mail
system destroyed the privilege per se and, alternatively, that Asia
Global's e-mail policy signified that use of the e-mail system
amounted to a waiver of otherwise privileged material.25 The company
officers being investigated argued that there was no such e-mail
policy.26
The court's central holding was that "the use of [a] company's e-
mail system does not, without more, destroy the privilege."27 In
addition, the court held that because of conflicting evidence as to
whether an e-mail policy even existed, the use of Asia Global's e-mail
system did not render the privilege waived.28
But the import of Asia Global was in its analysis. The court first
set out the requirement of confidentiality for the privilege to apply:
"The attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential
communication . . . . Confidentiality has both a subjective and
objective component; the communication must be given in
confidence, and the client must reasonably understand it to be so
given."29 The court then discussed Fourth Amendment cases in order
to arrive at a framework for determining the reasonableness of a given
employee who uses his or her company's e-mail server to
communicate with his or her attorney, and who believes the
231n re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 252 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
24 Id. at 253.
25 Id.
26 Id.
271d. at 251.
281d. at 259-61.
29 Id. at 255.
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communication is confidential.30 It asserted that "[t]here is a close
correlation between the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
and the objective reasonableness of the intent that a communication
between a lawyer and a client was given in confidence."31
The court adapted the privacy analysis to employee e-mails on
employers' computers and enumerated four factors that courts should
look to in determining whether an employee's expectation of privacy
in those e-mails was reasonable:
(1) [D]oes the corporation maintain a policy banning
personal or other objectionable use, (2) does the
company monitor the use of the employee's computer
or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access to
the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation
notify the employee, or was the employee aware, of the
use and monitoring policies?32
These factors have proven to have lasting significance, as many cases
have applied them to the issue of employee e-mails on employers'
computers. 33
C. Explanation of Recent Case Law
The purpose of this subpart is to show how cases since Asia Global
have analyzed the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to
employee e-mails on employers' computers. This includes application
of the Asia Global factors and other considerations such as the use of
30 Id. at 256-58.
31 Id. at 258-59. But see generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dangerous Trend
Blurring the Distinction Between a Reasonable Expectation of Confidentiality in Privilege
Law and a Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 57
Loy. L. REv. 1 (2011) (arguing that courts should not use an expectation-of-privacy analysis
in privilege cases).
32 Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 257.
33 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., No. 11-1278, 2012 WL 2501017, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2012); Goldstein v. Colborne Acquisition Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 932,
935-36 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2012); Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083,
1109-11 (W.D. Wash. 2011); In re Royce Holmes, LP, 449 B.R. 709, 737-41 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2011); Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 441-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2007).
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a personal, password-protected e-mail account and the location of the
computer.
1. Clarity of the Employer 's Computer Usage Policy
Before a computer usage policy can kill the privilege, the court
must first hold that such a policy applies. For example, in Asia Global,
the court held that because an applicable e-mail policy may not have
even existed, use of the company e-mail system did not kill the
privilege. 34 Additionally, in TransOcean Capital, Inc. v. Fortin,35
TransOcean hired another company to handle its human resources
matters, and the hired company had its own computer policy.36 But
TransOcean "neither explicitly nor implicitly adopted [the policy] as
its own."37 The court held that Fortin did not waive the privilege
through the use of TransOcean's e-mail system.38
Sometimes there is an applicable company policy, but it is too
unclear to kill the privilege. In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.,39
the company policy, which gave the company access to "all matters on
the company's media systems," neither defined "media systems" nor
addressed personal e-mail accounts at all.40 Therefore, "employees
[did] not have express notice that messages sent or received on a
personal, web-based e-mail account [were] subject to monitoring if
company equipment [was] used to access the account."41 The court
held that Stengart had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
communications and that use of the company computer did not kill
the privilege.42 Likewise, in National Economic Research Associates
34 In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 259-61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
3a TransOcean Capital, Inc. v. Fortin, No. 05-0955-BLS2, 2006 WL 3246401 (Mass.Super.
Oct. 20, 2006).
36 id. at *4.
37 Id.
38 Id. The court also held that some of those communications were waived for other
reasons. Id. at *5
39 Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
40 Id. at 659.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 655.
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v. Evans, 43 the policy declared that the company would monitor
"sites" but did not say so for "content."44 Moreover, the policy did not
"declare, or even implicitly suggest, that [the company] would monitor
the content of e-mail communications made from an employee's
personal e-mail account" or that the e-mails would be stored.45 And in
Orbit One Communications, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 4 6 the policy
stated that everything stored on company computers was recoverable
except for "communications [that] may be subject to the attorney-
client privilege ... or some other protection which is recognized by the
law."47 Thus, it was "uncertain whether an employee's expectation of
confidentiality would be unreasonable under any circumstances."48
Another source of the lack of clarity is when a policy does not ban
personal use of computers. Courts differ on the significance of that
circumstance: some courts find that an employee's expectation of
privacy is more reasonable if the company policy does not ban
personal use,4 9 while others find that such a circumstance does not
help the employee's case.50 The difference seems to be around whether
an employee may reasonably infer that privacy extends to e-mail use if
it extends to personal use. Naturally, then, a policy that explicitly
43 Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618 BLS2, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 371
(Mass. Super. Aug. 3, 2006).
44 Id. at *8-9-
45 Id. at *9.
46 Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 255 F.R.D. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
47Id. at io8 n.11.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., Convertino v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2009)
(citing the fact that the policy did not ban personal use as one reason the employee's
expectation of privacy was reasonable); United States v. Hatfield, No. o6-CR-0550 (JS),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106269, at *30-31 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009) (counting the fact that
the policy did not "expressly prohibit" personal use in the employee's favor even though the
policy stated that employees were "expect[ed]" to use company computers "solely for
business purposes").
5o See, e.g., Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1109 (W.D. Wash.
2011) (averring that the personal use factor counted against applying the privilege because
personal use was "discouraged" even though not banned outright); Banks v. Mario Indus.,
650 S.E.2d 687, 695-96 (Va. 2007) (holding that the employee waived the privilege even
though she was permitted to use work computers for personal business).
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states that the company may monitor e-mail use often prevents the
privilege from applying.51
2. Monitoring
The second Asia Global factor asks, "[D]oes the company monitor
the use of the employee's computer or e-mail[?]"52 Some cases suggest
that the relevant question is whether the company actually monitors
computer usage.53 In Curto, the policy stated that the company "may
... monitor use of computer resources."54 In fact, the company did not
enforce its usage policy except in four instances under very limited
circumstances, and this led to a "false sense of security."as This was
one reason the court held that the magistrate judge's ruling of no
waiver was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.56 But other cases
al See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (holding that the privilege did not apply when the company
policy stated that (a) personal use was banned, (b) employees "ha[d] no right of personal
privacy in ... e-mail," and (c) the company had the right to monitor its computers);
Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., No. o5-cV-1236 (JLL), 2006 WL 1307882, *4 (D.N.J. May
10, 20o6) (holding that the magistrate judge's ruling that the e-mails were not privileged
was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law when the company policy stated that e-mails
over the computer system were company property and subject to monitoring); Holmes v.
Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 882-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the e-
mails were not privileged because the company policy warned employees that personal use
was banned, that the company would monitor its computers, and that employees using
company computers for personal information or e-mails "have no right of privacy with
respect to that information or message"); Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d
436, 440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) ("[T]he effect of an employer e-mail policy, such as that of
[Beth Israel], is to have the employer looking over your shoulder each time you send an e-
mail.").
52 In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
53 See, e.g., Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH) (MLO), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29387, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) ("Although the court in Asia Global did
not explicitly discuss whether the employer actually monitored employees' computer
usage,... it did recognize enforcement as a factor to be considered.").
54 Id. at *2-3 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at *8.
56 See id. at *23-5.
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suggest that it is irrelevant whether a company actually monitors
computer usage as long as it clearly states it has the right to do So.57
3. Knowledge Requirement
Without knowledge of the company policy, an employee's belief in
the confidentiality of his e-mail communications with his attorney is
reasonable. 58 Because the absence of a policy renders the belief
reasonable, and absence of the policy has the same effect (or
noneffect) on one's belief as not knowing of the policy's existence, the
same result follows for lack of knowledge. But a court may infer
knowledge from circumstantial facts-it need not find actual
knowledge, but rather that the employee knew of the policy or should
have known. In this way, such knowledge can be constructive. This is
often the case with employees in a supervisory role.59
57 See, e.g., In re Royce Holmes, LP, 449 B.R. 709, 739 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) ("Although
the Trustee introduced no evidence on actual enforcement of the Debtor's monitoring
policy, whether the Debtor actually reads an employee's e-mails is irrelevant."); Holmes v.
Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 898 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("Absent a company
communication to employees explicitly contradicting the company's warning to them that
company computers are monitored ... it is immaterial that the 'operational reality' is the
company does not actually do so."); Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436,
442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) ("The second requirement is satisfied because [Beth Israel]'s
policy allows for monitoring. Although BI acknowledges that it did not monitor Dr. Scott's
e-mail, it retains the right to do so in the e-mail policy."); see also Jae Park, Electronic
Communications and the Attorney-Client Privilege, MCKENNA LONG & ALDRIDGE LLP, 3
(Feb. 5, 2oo8), http://www.mckennalong.com/assets/attachments/Electronic
Communications andThe AttorneyClient_.pdf ("If a company clearly notifies its
employees that personal e-mails and Internet use are not private and may be monitored,
whether the company actually monitors e-mails and Internet use should be
inconsequential.").
58 Mason v. ILS Techs., LLC, No. 3:04-CV-139-RJC-DCK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28905, at
*10 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 2oo8) (holding that the employee's belief was reasonable where the
company "fail[ed] to show that [it] effectively conveyed [the] ... email policy").
59 See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, No. o6-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106269,
at *32 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009) (stating that "it is fair and logical to presume that [the
employee] had knowledge of' the policy when it was "implemented under his watch");
Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2011) ("As a
senior level manager, Mr. Benitez was 'expected to know the contents of company policies
so [he] could properly manage and supervise employees.' Accordingly, Mr. Benitez is fairly
charged with constructive knowledge of the company's policies concerning electronic
communications." (citation omitted)); Scott, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (holding that the
employee had constructive knowledge of the policy where "[h]e required newly hired
doctors under his supervision to acknowledge in writing that they were aware of the
policy.").
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4. Use of a Personal, Password-Protected Account
Courts are divided on the significance of the use of a personal,
password-protected account. In Evans, it was one of several factors
that led the court to conclude that the employee took adequate steps
to ensure the confidentiality of his communications, thus securing the
privilege.60 In Stengart, the court held that the employee's expectation
of privacy was objectively reasonable when the company policy did not
specifically address personal accounts. 61 And the court went even
further in dicta:
Because of the important public policy concerns
underlying the attorney-client privilege, even . . . a
policy that . . . provided unambiguous notice that an
employer could retrieve and read an employee's
attorney-client communications, if accessed on a
personal, password-protected e-mail account using the
company's computer system-would not be
enforceable. 62
Likewise, in Sims v. Lakeside School,63 the court drew a line based
on policy considerations between e-mails Sims sent from his company
account and those he sent from his personal account: after holding
that Sims had no expectation of privacy over "Lakeside e-mails," the
court held that "to the extent that the laptop contain[ed] web-based e-
mails . . . such information is protected . . ."64 The court explained,
"[P]ublic policy dictates that such communications shall be protected
60 Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618BLS2, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 371,
at *9, *11, *13 (Mass. Super. Aug. 3, 2006). Other contributing factors were that he did not
save the e-mails as documents, he tried to delete all personal documents on his company
laptop before returning it, and he defragmented the computer in an attempt to render his
personal documents irretrievable. Id. at *11. But see id. at *5 (insinuating that the company
could make e-mails from a personal account discoverable by stating clearly in its policy
that such e-mails are stored and retrievable).
61 Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2010).
62 Id. at 665. For a discussion of these public policy concerns, see supra Part II.A.
63 Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. Co6-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20,
2007).
64 Id. at *2.
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to preserve the sanctity of communications made in confidence." 65
One commentator also lends support to the Sims court's rationale:
"Should an employee use company equipment to transmit a
communication via a personal account rather than a company
account, it stands to reason that the expectation of privacy
increases." 66
Other cases have held that the use of a personal, password-
protected account does not make the expectation of privacy
reasonable. In Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co., 67 the court held
that use of such an account was of no moment given the clear warning
that employees had no expectation of privacy in e-mails on company
computers: "This is akin to consulting [one's] attorney in one of
defendants' conference rooms, in a loud voice, with the door open, yet
unreasonably expecting that the conversation overheard by [the
employer] would be privileged." 68 In Long v. Marubeni America
Corp.,69 the employees, despite using personal accounts, "disregarded
the [company policy's] admonishment voluntarily and, as a
consequence, ha[d] stripped from the e-mail messages . . . the
confidential cloak with which they claim[ed] those communications
were covered."70 In Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc.,71 the court
stated there was "no reason to distinguish between emails that were
sent from or received on the company's email system and emails that
were accessed through the company's laptop on [the employees'] web-
based email accounts."72
Although many courts have weighed in on the effect of using a
personal, password-protected account, at least one court explicitly left
the issue open, "leav[ing] for another day whether there is waiver
65 Id.
66 Hill, supra note 19, at 590.
6 7 Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
68 Id. at 896.
69 Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp, No. 05Civ.639(GEL)(KNF), 2006 WL 2998671 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2006).
70 Id. at *3.
71 Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
721d. at 1110.
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when the employee attempts to protect work-based e-mails through a
personal password-protected web site."73
5. Location of the Computer
At least two courts have suggested that the location of the
computer is a significant factor (one that was not included in Asia
Global), holding that an expectation of confidentiality was reasonable
where the employee did not use the computer in the employer's
offices.74 The implication is that it is reasonable to believe that if an
employer cannot get his or her hands on the physical computer, then
neither can the employer get expunged e-mails sent from or viewed on
the computer while it was not connected to the company server. One
commentator supports that view, arguing that "[t]he physical location
of the computer has logical and legal significance in workplace waiver
cases .... Allowing an employee to take a computer into his or her
home, then later using information stored on that computer against
the employee, smacks of a Trojan Horse."75
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Proposal
Rather than trying to determine the reasonableness of a belief in e-
mail confidentiality, courts should apply the following test: (1) The
privilege is presumed to not apply if, and only if, there is a clear policy
allowing monitoring or retrieval of e-mails, and the employee knows
73 Alamar Ranch, LLC v. Cnty. of Boise, No. CV-09-oo4-S-BLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
ioi866, at *10-11 (D. Idaho Nov. 2, 2009).
74 See Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH) (MLO), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29387, at *16-17 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 20o6) (distinguishing the facts from those in
Fourth Amendment cases by use of the computer at home, holding that the employee's
belief in the confidentiality of the e-mails was reasonable where the computer was not
connected to the company's server and the employee deleted all personal files before
returning the computer, and limiting the holding to whether use of a company computer at
home waives the privilege); Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 255 F.R.D. 98,
io8 (S.D.N.Y. 2OO8) (analogizing the facts to those of Curto because the company "never
had ready access to [the employee's] computer" and holding that the expectation of
confidentiality was reasonable under the circumstances).
75 Losey, supra note 10, at 1197 (footnotes omitted).
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or should know about it; (2) The employee can override that
presumption by attempting to protect his e-mails at all relevant times.
1. Step One: Presumption That the Privilege Does Not Apply
Without a policy clearly allowing employers to view employee e-
mails, the privilege should apply. With such a policy, the privilege
should be presumed dead. The Stengart and Evans cases show how
clear the policy should be.76 As a practical matter, companies should
err on the side of clarity because if they do not, courts that are
otherwise inclined to favor the application of the privilege will in fact
apply it.77 And courts should apply it in that scenario. If a reasonable
person could interpret a company policy to mean that employees had
a reasonable expectation of confidentiality, then by definition, an
employee's belief in the confidentiality of those e-mails is objectively
reasonable.
But if the policy clearly allows the employer to view an employee's
e-mails and the employee understands this, then an employee's
expectation of confidentiality should be presumed unreasonable. One
commentator explicitly promotes the use of such a presumption.78
Another commentator recommends utilizing Justice Holmes's "one
free bite rule" in Bates v. Dresser79 for analyzing employee e-mails.ao
76 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. But see Fazio v. Temp. Excellence, Inc.,
No. A-5441-08T3, 2012 WL 300634, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 2, 2012)
(distinguishing this case from Stengart and holding that even where the company lacked
an e-mail policy, the e-mails were not privileged because the employee "took no steps
whatsoever to shield the e-mails from his employer" and "us[ed] his employer's own e-mail
system on its own computer equipment, and did not password-protect those
communications"). Fazio shows that it may even be better for employers to have no policy
than an unclear one; under Fazio, use of the employer's server may be enough to warn of
monitoring.
77 See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655, 665 (N.J. 2010)
(declaring in dicta that even a clear policy would not trump the privilege when the
employee uses a personal, password-protect account, and holding that the employee had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mails because the application of the policy was
not clear enough).
78 Losey, supra note 10, at 1204 ("If the policies make clear that the employee has no
expectation of privacy while using a workplace computer, then it is logical to establish a
presumption that privilege has been waived.").
79 Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
8o Gergacz, supra note 4, at 280.
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In Bates, Holmes wrote, "Some animals must have given at least one
exhibition of dangerous propensities before the owner can be held
[1iable]."1 A policy that clearly allows an employer to view employees'
e-mails is an "exhibition of dangerous propensities" when it comes to
the confidentiality of attorney-client communications. And many
other commentators, while not explicitly suggesting a no-privilege
presumption, suggest that the existence of a clear company policy
should diminish the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in e-
mails.32 The Supreme Court also acknowledges the effect of company
policies, noting that they "will of course shape the reasonable
expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such
policies are clearly communicated."8 3 The implication is that clear
company policies lower the threshold for reasonableness-in other
words, it becomes less likely that a given employee's expectation of
privacy is reasonable because when there is a clear company policy,
employees in general lower their expectations.
Whether a policy bans all personal use of company computers
should not matter for the no-privilege presumption. Allowing personal
use is logically consistent with an explicit warning that personal use,
including e-mails, may be monitored. This is so because personal use
need not be prohibited behavior-it can be permitted behavior that
comes with a price, which may be that personal use may be
monitored. Of course, if there is no policy stating that personal use
may be monitored, perhaps allowing it increases the reasonableness of
believing it will not be monitored, while banning it decreases the
reasonableness because the ban serves as a warning. (Even with a
personal-use ban, the absence of a policy that e-mails may be
81Bates, 251 U.S. at 529.
82 See, e.g., Gergacz, supra note 4, at 281 (following the discussion of the "one free bite
rule," see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text, with the statement that "[a]n
employer's policy, in that regard, may well create heightened obligation, like the one placed
on a dog-owner whose canine is known to bite"); Hill, supra note 19, at 590 ("[W]hen an
employee uses a monitored company e-mail account on an employer-issued computer
having knowledge of this type of company policy, any expectation of privacy should be
diminished."); Kara R. Williams, Note, Protecting What You Thought Was Yours:
Expanding Employee Privacy To Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from Employer
Computer Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 363 (2008) ("[I]f the employer has a policy of
monitoring its employees and the employee is aware of the policy, the attorney-client
privilege may not apply because the employee 'understand[s] ... that the communication
is to be made known to others."' (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352,
1356 (4th Cir. 1984)).
83 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (emphasis added).
260o [VOL. 9:2
2013]
monitored should render the expectation of privacy in e-mails per se
reasonable. So many companies have monitoring policies that the
absence of one is too significant.) But an explicit policy stating that
personal use may be monitored enumerates the price of personal use
if allowed-it thus takes away any evidentiary value of allowing
personal use for the employee who thinks that means there will be no
monitoring. So given such a policy, the fact that an employee may use
the computer for personal matters should not make his expectation in
the confidentiality of those matters more reasonable. Moreover,
holding that the privilege trumps a company policy when the policy
allows for personal use may lead to negative consequences for both
employers and employees by encouraging prohibitions of personal
use.8 4
As for whether actual monitoring or merely the right to monitor
should be required, the latter is more logical. Whether a company
policy states the employer "will" or "may" monitor computer usage,
the employee presumably does not know whether the employer is
actually monitoring. And given the prevalence of monitoring,8 5 the
mere allowance of it in a clear company policy should render an
employee's expectation of confidentiality presumed unreasonable.86
2. Step Two: The Concept ofEarning the Privilege
Even if a company policy creates a presumption that the privilege
does not apply, employees should be able to override that
presumption by showing they earned the protection of the privilege by
attempting to protect the e-mails at all relevant times.
a. Earning the Protection
Employees should be able to overcome the presumption that the
privilege does not apply to e-mails on employers' computers by
showing, essentially, that they deserve the protection of the
84 Id. at 2629-30 ("[M]any employers expect or at least tolerate personal use of such
equipment by employees because it often increases worker efficiency." (citing Brief of Elec.
Frontier Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, City of Ontario v. Quon,
130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332)).
8a See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
86 But see infra Part III.B.i (showing how employees may earn the protection of the
privilege under this Note's proposal if they know their employers do not actually monitor
computer usage).
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privilege.8 7 Employees can do this by engaging in protective behavior
at all relevant times. 88 Without engaging in protective behavior,
employees are at best only assuming that the privilege would apply
despite the clear threat to confidentiality from the company policy;
under this proposal, it would not.9
In this way, the privilege is not a "paper tiger."9o But it is a caged
one. By engaging in protective behavior, employees can let the tiger
out of its cage and enjoy its protection.
b. Protective Behavior
To raise the privilege above the presumption against it, employees
should have to engage in behavior that they believe will prevent
employers from viewing employee e-mails, whether on the employer's
server or a private account. While this is related to the reasonable-
expectation inquiry,91 it is not necessarily connected. Employees can
satisfy this facet of the test with behavior that a court would hold does
not lead to a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. For example,
while many courts hold that use of a private, password-protected
account does not lead to a reasonable expectation of confidentiality,92
87 This poses the reverse of the question the Curto court posed. In Curto, the "heart of the
overriding question" was whether the employee's conduct was "so careless as to suggest
that she was not concerned with the protection of the privilege." Curto v. Med. World
Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29387, at *15
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006). Here, rather than starting with the privilege then asking whether
the employee's carelessness kills it, this proposal begins with the presumption that the
privilege does not apply (assuming the company policy is clear) then asks whether the
employee has earned the privilege.
88 For specific examples of such behavior, see infra Part III.B.
89 See Gergacz, supra note 4, at 283 ("Failure to implement protective measures
demonstrates the employee's disregard for confidentiality and, thus, jeopardizes the
privilege."). Under this Note's proposal, such disregard would not jeopardize the privilege
because the privilege would not exist to begin with due to the presumption based on
company policy. Rather, the failure to implement protective measures would prevent the
employee from overriding the presumption against the application of the privilege.
90 Losey, supra note 10, at 1188.
91 See Hill, supra note 19, at 590 ("The expectation is especially increased if protective
measures are taken, such as using a personal account that is password-protected, deleting
a message, or intentionally not saving a message.").
92 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
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under the proposed test here, it could.93 Conversely, employees can
fail to satisfy this test with behavior that some courts hold does lead to
a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, while some courts
hold that use of a company computer outside of the office renders an
expectation of confidentiality reasonable, 94 under this test, an
employee who uses a computer at home but fails to take protective
action when handing the computer back to the employer jeopardizes
the privilege.95
c. At All Relevant Times
There are two key time periods in this inquiry. One is when the
employee uses the employer's computer for e-mail. At that moment,
the employer may be monitoring the computer. The second is when
the employer retrieves the e-mails. In order to overcome the
presumption, the employee should be required to engage in behavior
intended to protect confidentiality at both of those times, if applicable.
If, for example, an employee deletes e-mails in an effort to prevent the
employer from retrieving them, that alone should not overcome the
presumption if the employee had not attempted to prevent the
employer from monitoring the computer to begin with.
d. State ofMind Requirement
If one knows that a particular protective behavior would not work,
then engaging in it cannot overcome the presumption. For example, in
Kaufman v. SunGard Investment Systems,96 the company policy
warned that the employer had the right to access e-mails even if they
were password-protected.97 An employee with actual or constructive
knowledge of that policy could not then overcome the presumption by
using a personal, password-protected account. This is because the
employee would not have a subjective belief in the confidentiality of
the e-mails.
93 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the circumstances under which using a personal,
password-protected account would overcome the presumption against the privilege).
94 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
95 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
96 Kaufman v. SunGard Investment Systems, No. 05-cV-1236 (JLL), 2006 WL 1307882
(D.N.J. May 10, 2006).
97 Id. at *4
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B. The Proposal Applied
1. Timing
Before discussing how timing plays a role in this analysis, it is
important to distinguish between non-application and waiver of the
privilege. The privilege does not apply if the communication one seeks
to protect is not confidential .. .9 The privilege is waived when, once
it applies, the privilege-holder does not sufficiently protect it.99
If an employee fails to take action to protect e-mails from being
monitored at the time he writes or views them, the privilege should
not apply to begin with. One step employees can take toward earning
the privilege is showing that they know the employer does not actually
monitor computers, regardless of what the policy says.100 For instance,
in Curto, the company had monitored computers on only four
occasions under limited circumstances.101 If the employee knew that
the company monitored computers under limited circumstances and
that none of those circumstances applied to his situation, the privilege
should be preserved. By discovering (or confirming) the truth about
monitoring, employees would have taken protective measures, and the
privilege should therefore apply.
If an employee fails to take action to protect e-mails from being
retrieved at a later stage, the privilege, if any still exists,102 should be
98 See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 255 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The
attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication .... Confidentiality
has both a subjective and objective component; the communication must be given in
confidence, and the client must reasonably understand it to be so given.").
99 See, e.g., Gergacz, supra note 4, at 279 ("The waiver focus here is whether the e-mail
communications with counsel are satisfactorily safeguarded. Here, the potential waiver
stems from client inaction, from a failure to adequately protect confidentiality.").
100 Rather than placing the burden on the employer to show that the company actually
monitors employee e-mails, this proposal requires the employee to show an absence of
actual monitoring. After all, it is the employee's state of mind that is relevant.
101 Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH) (MLO), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29387, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
102 If the employee did not try to protect the e-mails from monitoring to begin with, the
privilege would not still exist. But if the employee already earned the privilege at the time
of potential monitoring, or if, for example, the employee used the employer's computer at
home, where monitoring was not possible, then his later protective actions become
dispositive.
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held waived. Behavior that should preserve the privilege at this time
includes deleting e-mails in order to protect them,103 defragmenting
the computer, 10 4 or encrypting e-mails.o5
2. State ofMind
One factor in particular ought to turn on the employee's state of
mind. If an employee uses a personal, password-protected account,
the dispositive issue should be his motivation. If he uses such an
account to prevent monitoring and retrieval of the e-mails, the
privilege should survive because the use of a personal account would
be a protective action. If instead the use of the personal account is
coincidental, the presumption against the privilege should win out
because there is, at best, only an assumption.
Of course, use of personal accounts is easy and commonplace, and
it may be difficult to ascertain the motivation behind it. Courts can
avoid this problem by presuming that use of a personal account where
a workplace account was otherwise available had a protective goal,
and placing the burden on the employer to show otherwise.10 6
C. Benefits of the Proposal
This proposal would introduce two compromises. First, it
responds to both the concern of excluding relevant evidence and that
of discouraging attorney communications. By presuming that the
privilege does not apply if the company policy is clear, this Note's
proposal tips the scale in favor of admissibility. But by allowing
employees to override the presumption by earning the privilege, the
103 See Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618 BLS2, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS
371, at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 3, 2006); Curto, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29387, at *17. This is
another example of behavior that can earn the privilege even though courts may hold that
it does not lead to a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. See, e.g., Banks v. Mario
Indus., 650 S.E.2d 687, 695-96 (Va. 2007) (holding that a document was not privileged
even though the employee deleted it from the employer's computer prior to forensic
retrieval).
104 See Evans, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 371, at *3.
1o5 See Gergacz, supra note 4, at 284 ("Encrypting electronic messages, like locking a
document in a safe, should be sufficient to ward off waiver, even if the barricade is
overcome.").
106 But see supra Part III.A.2.d (showing where even use of a personal account cannot
overcome the presumption against the privilege).
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proposal allows clients to confide in their attorneys without
discouraging such behavior: those employees who think that taking
some action will protect the privilege are right, while those who stand
idly by in the face of a clear company policy will not have the privilege
to begin with. 107 Even if the employee's action does not actually
protect the e-mails (for example, if an employee deletes e-mails and
defragments the computer but the employer is still able to retrieve the
e-mails forensically), the protective action saves the privilege
nonetheless. That is the point: employees who are wrong about a
particular course of action's efficacy may still enjoy the privilege if that
is the reason they engaged in the action to begin with. And the action
need not be substantial-as long as the employee subjectively believes
that the action will protect the e-mails, the action should save the
privilege. (Whether that belief itself would be reasonable may serve as
evidence of the employee's actual subjective belief.) Employees will
therefore be no more discouraged by this rule than by the rule that
communications are not privileged if not confidential.
The second compromise of this proposal is between extreme
stances on the significance of certain factors. For example, while some
courts hold that the use of a personal, password-protected account is
irrelevant and others hold that it is dispositive,1os under this proposal,
it depends on the employee's state of mind. 109 Likewise, the
significance of deleting e-mails to protect them from retrieval, for
example, depends not on whether judges feel the behavior gives rise to
a reasonable expectation of privacy, but rather on whether the
privilege survived the monitoring moment to begin with.110
For that reason, this proposal also makes outcomes more
predictable. The reasonableness test has led to a wide variety of
results and is malleable enough for judges to make decisions based on
desired outcomes. This test, however, is simpler: the company policy
either applies or does not, and the employee either takes protective
107 Cf. Henry Ford Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE.COM, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
quotes/h/henryfordl22817.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) ("If you think you can do a
thing or think you can't do a thing, you're right.").
108 See supra Part II.C.4 (explaining courts' views on the significance of personal,
password-protected accounts).
log See supra Part III.B.2 (declaring that the employee's motivation for using a personal
account is dispositive).
110 See supra note 102. Deleting e-mails is one example of a later protective action that
would become dispositive.
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actions or does not. This will also make judges' jobs easier. Rather
than deciding what is reasonable in this modern, technological
world,111judges would just have to answer these two questions: (1)
Does the company policy apply? (2) If so, did the employee take the
necessary protective action(s)?
D. Objections
One who believes that this proposal reins in the privilege too much
might argue that it is unfair for employees who travel a lot or spend
long hours at their workplaces.112 But for employees who believe that
taking some action such as deleting the e-mails from the laptop would
protect confidentiality: that is all that would be necessary to save the
privilege from waiver. Traveling employees would therefore be even
better off than their non-traveling counterparts because the travelers
would not have to worry about protecting the communications from
monitoring.113
By contrast, employees who know such measures would not work
would not even have a subjective belief in confidentiality. Thus, the
privilege could not apply. Perhaps, then, there should be a bright-line
rule that the privilege always applies to communications between
traveling employees and their attorneys. But that would not take into
account the concern of admitting relevant evidence.114
M See Losey, supra note 10, at 1201-02, 1203-04 (recommending the use of experts to
help determine what beliefs are objectively reasonable because "few judges have significant
experience with technology, and some appear to personally identify with technologically
unsophisticated employees").
112 See Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, 04-2618BLS2, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 371,
at *12 (Mass. Super. Aug. 3, 2006) (warning that if the privilege did not apply, traveling
employees would find it difficult to communicate with their attorneys confidentially
because the e-mails would be saved on the company laptop); ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 459 (2011) ("Third parties may have access to attorney-
client e-mails when the client receives or sends e-mails via a ... hotel computer..."); i
PAUL R. RICE, ATIORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 6:8 (2011 ed.) (also
raising the issue of urgent legal matters that require constant communication with
attorneys even when employees are at work).
113 See supra note 102.
114 See supra Part III.C (showing how this Note's proposal would satisfy both the concern of
admitting evidence and that of encouraging attorney-client communications); see also
Losey, supra note 10, at 1203 ("An attempt to produce clarity through the imposition of a
forced bright-line test would cause unnecessary rigidity.").
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One who believes that this proposal would exclude too much
relevant evidence might argue that because the computers are
employer-owned, the employers can confiscate them at any time, and
therefore employee e-mails are subject to retrieval before employees
take protective actions.115 That would mean the e-mails are never truly
confidential even if employees protected them from monitoring. It is
often the case, however, that owners who give up some property rights
may have to give up others. 116 Because employers are allowing
employees to use the computers, they should also have to allow
employees to attempt to protect e-mails or other documents or files
from retrieval.117
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Summary of the Proposal
Courts have approached the problem of whether the attorney-
client privilege applies to an employee who uses an employer's
computer for e-mail by determining whether the employee's belief in
the confidentiality of the communications was objectively reasonable.
But courts vary widely as to what circumstances give rise to a
reasonable belief. Rather than focusing exclusively on reasonableness,
courts should instead apply a two-part test. First, does the company
policy clearly allow the employer to view employee e-mails through
monitoring or retrieval? If not, the communications should be
privileged. If so, there should be a presumption that they are not
privileged. If there is such a presumption, then the second part of the
test is: did the employee engage in protective behavior at all relevant
115 For examples of company policies that seem to allow such behavior, see supra note 51.
116 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (U.S. 1946) ("Ownership does
not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up
his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."); State
v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371-72 (N.J. 1971) (holding that a farmer could not "bar
access to governmental services available to migrant workers" and averring that
"[tilitle to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the
owner permits to come upon the premises").
117 Cf RICE, supra note 112, at § 6:8 (suggesting that cases such as Asia Global,
Evans, and Sims "may be part of a larger body of decisional law that will set limits
on the types of employee privacy expectations that employers cannot unilaterally
make unreasonable because of societal expectations. . . ").
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times-before the e-mails can be monitored and before they are
retrieved, as applicable? If so, the privilege should apply. If not, it
should be held waived. This approach would lead to compromise in
policy concerns and in extreme stances on certain circumstances, and
to greater predictability of results.
B. Significance ofABA Formal Opinion 11-459
In August 2011, the ABA released a formal opinion entitled "Duty
to Protect the Confidentiality of E-mail Communications with One's
Client."113 Some commentators had recommended such a measure. 119
Significantly, the opinion leaves the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege as an open question.120 Also, the opinion provides another
way for employees to earn the privilege under this Note's proposal: if
employees check with their attorneys prior to communicating via e-
mail on employers' computers, attorneys should warn them about the
risks and encourage them to seek other means of communication. If
an attorney fails to give such a warning and the employee
communicates using the employer's computer, the act of consulting
the attorney should nevertheless count as earning the privilege. The
opinion also makes die-hard protection of the privilege in these cases
less necessary: attorneys' warnings may provide protection enough.
Finally, the opinion is evidence of a changing world. 121
118 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 459 (2011).
119 See Dion Messer, To: Client@Workplace.com: Privilege at Risk?, 23 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 75, 97-98 (2004) (presenting the option of the ABA issuing a
requirement that attorneys warn clients of the risks inherent in workplace e-mails);
Williams, supra note 82, at 387-89 (recommending the issuance of an ABA opinion
requiring extra precaution by attorneys regarding workplace e-mails in order to "provide
enhanced protection to the attorney-client privilege in a relatively easy and cost-effective
manner").
120 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 459 (2011) ("This
Committee's mission does not extend to interpreting the substantive law, and therefore we
express no view on whether, and in what circumstances, an employee's communications
with counsel from the employee's workplace device or system are protected by the
attorney-client privilege.").
121 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 413 (1999) ("A lawyer
may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail
sent over the Internet without violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998)
because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a
technological and legal standpoint.").
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C. Limitation of the Proposal with Respect to the Future
This analysis stems partly from a misunderstanding of technology.
As the public's understanding grows, analyses must grow with it.
Indeed, the cases explained above are "only the tip of the iceberg" in
this "rapidly changing world."122 Because of that, judges, attorneys,
and the public alike should pay attention to developments in this and
similar areas of the law.
122 Anthony P. Schoenberg, Attorney-Client Communications Sent over Employer E-mail
Systems May Not Be Privileged, 3 Privacy & Data Security L. J., 369, 374 (2008); accord
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) ("Rapid changes in the dynamics of
communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself
but in what society accepts as proper behavior.").
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